Balancing Innovation and Biosecurity: Governing the Dual-Use Risks of AI in Synthetic Biology

This project was a runner-up for the "Other exceptional project" prize on our Pandemics (Sept 2024) course. The text below is an excerpt from the final project.

Introduction

Artificial intelligence (AI) is at the forefront of a revolution in synthetic biology, transforming fields such as drug discovery, genetic engineering, and biomanufacturing. By automating complex analyses and processing vast datasets, AI accelerates the design and production of biological and chemical compounds, paving the way for groundbreaking advancements in medicine, agriculture, and environmental sustainability. These innovations promise to enhance global health, address food insecurity, and mitigate the effects of climate change.

However, the convergence of AI and biotechnology also presents profound risks. The same tools that enable progress can be misused to create harmful biological agents or evade existing biosecurity measures. For instance, AI-driven design platforms could potentially be exploited to engineer pathogens with increased virulence, posing threats that transcend borders. The democratization of AI tools, while expanding access to smaller labs and resource-limited settings, heightens the risk of malicious actors misusing these technologies to develop bioweapons or conduct bioterrorism.

This dual-use dilemma demands a proactive and comprehensive approach to governance. Balancing the transformative potential of AI in synthetic biology with its dual-use risks demands proactive governance, equitable access, and international collaboration to ensure global safety. By learning from historical drivers of biological threats and addressing global inequities, we can develop equitable and effective solutions. The following analysis explores AI's transformative capabilities, the challenges it presents, and the policies needed to ensure its safe and ethical application.

Full project

You can view the full project here.